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THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY. By Walter V. Schaefer. Northwestern
University Press, Evanston, Illinois 1967. Reviewed by Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., of the Virginia Bar (Richmond).
This timely and superbly written volume, by one of America's
most respected state judges, contains the Rosenthal Lectures
delivered in the spring of 1966 at Northwestern University School
of Law.

The subject is custodial police interrogation and the

constitutional doctrines bearing upon it, with emphasis on the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.
Justice Schaefer anticipated that the convergence of these
doctrines would preclude the effective questioning of persons
suspected of crime.

It is a tribute to Justice Schaefer's prescience

that he held this view in the spring of 1966 after Escobedo* but
before Miranda.**

The earlier decision had extended the Sixth

Amendment right t to counsel to the "accusatory" stage when attention
had focused upon a "prime suspect."

Miranda, decided in June, 1966,

and reading new doctrine into the Fifth Amendment, encompassed all
"custodial interrogation" regardless of the "stage" or whether
suspicion had "focused."
In the subsequent months debate has raged - in the Congress, at
bar meetings and in the literature - as to the effect which these
historic cases will have on police interrogation.
severely curtailed, few can doubt.

That it will be

The debate centers on questions

of degree, on certain remaining ambiguities,*** and also - among

v.

/ *Escobedo
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
V **Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
***See Elsen & Rosett, Protections for the Suspect under Miranda v.
Arizona, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 645 (1967); Warden, Miranda - Some
History, Some Observations and Some Questions, 20 Vand. L. Rev. 39
(1966); George, A New Look at Confessions: Escobedo-The Second
Round, a collection of lectures and panel discussions sponsored
by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, Ann Arbor, 1967.
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academicians primarily - as to whether interrogation is worth saving.
Justice -Schaefer sheds light on all of this.
One would have thought that the usefulness, if not indeed the
necessity, , of police interrogation was beyond rational debate.

As

Justice Schaefer notef, a high percentage of all criminal cases is
disposed of upon pleas of guilty, and in most of these cases the
accused has confessed or admitted guilt upon interrogation.* Many
cases which go to trial also involve pre-arraignment admissions.
Thus, the issue relates to a cornerstone of our present system~
In assessing the usefulness of interrogation and the role of
resulting confessions, Justice Schaefer is keenly aware of abuses
in the past, and of the impossibility of eliminating all oppressive
conduct short of outlawing all interrogation.**

But balancing the

interests involved, he concludes that "police interrogation (is) a
useful and desirable technique of law enforcement."
is in good company.

Justice Schaefer

If we look only to former members of the Court,

Justices Frankfurter, Goldberg and Jackson each tha~ recognized
the utility of police interrogation.**
Supporters of the new restrictions, while applauding the
broadened protection of suspects, argue that law enforcement will
not be unduly handicapped.

First, they suggest tmt resourceful,

*Studies show the percentage of convictions resulting from guilty
pleas running as high as 98% in some jurisdictions. See Goldstein,
The State and the Accused, 69 Yale L.J., 1149, 1163 n.37 (1960).
**He notes that the legal systems of other countries, even where
interrogation is restricted, do not go to the extreme of excluding
all evidence obtained without regard to its reliability.
✓ **1\Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: "Questioning suspects is indispensable
in law enforcement." Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 578
(1961) (separate opinion), quoting People v. Hall, 413 Ill. , 615,
624, 110 N.E.2d 249, 254 (1953). See also Mr. Justice Jackson's
statement in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 58 (1949)(concerning
in part, dissenting in part); and that of Mr. Justice Goldberg in
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963).
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well trained and scientifically equipped police can obtain necessary
evidence without resort to interrogation.

Yet, as Justice Schaefer

states from his own experience, even where witnesses are available
to identify the suspect, such evidence often is unreliable.

And

past experience indicates that relatively few convictions result
from laboratory or scientific investigation.

If, as now proposed

to the Congress, electronic surviellance is who~ly denied to law
enforcement, a most effective means of scientific detection will
not be available - even against organized crime.
It is also argued by some that meaningful interrogation will
not in fact be eliminated.

The opinion in Miranda merely lays down

a detailed code of procedure.

If this procedure is strictly followed,

interrogation may take place - provided the suspect does not request
counsel.

This is a significant proviso.

The suspect is entitled to

counsel unless he knowingly "waives" the right.

No lawyer ''worth his

salt" will permit his client to be interrogated by police.*

As this

right to counsel, provided at State expense, becomes generally known
and as court decisions implement Miranda and Escobedo, the only room
for doubt concerns the extent to which interrogation and investigation
will be handicapped.**
For his part, Justice Schaefer concludes:
Today, I believe, the doctrines converging
upon the institution of police interrogation
are threatening to push on to their logical
conclusion - to the point where no questioning
of suspects will be permitted.

V

-lcMr. Justice Jackson, in Watts v. Indiana, supr~ at •S9.
**Another distinguished state court justice, also writing prior to
Miranda, described the situation as a "mounting crisis" in the constitutional rules that "reach out to govern police interrogation."
Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention,
and Trial, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657, 664 (1966). See also Friendly,
The Bill of Ri hts as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif. L. Rev.
929 1965; Lumbar, The Administration of Criminal Justice: Some
Problems and Their Resolution, 49 A.B.A.J. 840 (1963).
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One solution, he suggests, lies in the development of a legislative
code to govern the defendant's pre-arraignment rights.

In this

context, Justice Schaefer analyzes sympathetically the proposed
ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Proced~re.·*
three periods of detention:

This contemplates

on the scene for 20 minutes without

counsel; for four hours at the police station, with counsel if
desired; and thereafter in certain cases for a longer period but
only upon consent of counsel.

Although commending the Code as a

"rational adjustment," Justice Schaefer questions whether the
Sixth Amendment requires a lawyer's presence during any period of
police interrogation.

If the Constitution requires a lawyer for

station house interrogation, logic would require him for on-the•
scene interrogation as well.

It would be "obviously impracticable,"

he adds, "to equip every squad car with instant counsel."
Yet, Miranda appears to require just that.
thrust is against "custodial interrogation."

Its principal

This was defined

as including "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been • • • deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way."'k,\-

As Professor Kamisar has said, the

language used by the Court "clearly covers the stop-on-the•streetand-question situation."**

Thus, unless the Court's language

is modified, there cannot be "on the scene" interrogation without
counsel if he is requested.
*Prepared by American Law Institute, Tentative Draft No. 1, 1966.
V **Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 444.
✓ **""George, supra pp. 98, 99.
~, ,\ r4
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In the last of his three brillant lectures, Justice Schaefer
subjects the privilege against self-incrimination to searching
scrutiny.

He concludes that the privilege, as now interpreted,

is justified neither by its history nor by any need to protect
the innocent in a criminal trial.*

The historic purpose of the

privilege, as he noted, is protection against governmental suppression of ideas - particularly against inquisitions into
political or religious beliefs.

This high purpose "now is in

the process of being remitted to ' the First Amendment" where it
belongs.

There is an emerging "First Amendment privilege" not

to respond to questions which diminish the significance of the
Fifth Amendment.**
If ascertainment of the truth is - as one would hope - a
basic objective of our criminal justice system, we should put
aside slavish adherence to the privileg~ and adopt more realistic
reforms.

Justice Schaefer thinks the answer lies in broad mutual

discovery in criminal cases.

He recalls the fight, three decades

ago, for pre-trial discovery in civil cases, now proved successful beyond even the fondest hopes.

*As to the history, see 3 Wigmore, Evidence 819 (3d ed. 1940);
Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination
Clause, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1930); Developments in the Law Confessions, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 935 (1966); Morgan, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1949). As to
protection of the innocent, in Tehan v. United States ex rel.
Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966), the Court itself said that
"the basic purposes that lie behind the privilege against selfincrimination do not relate to protecting the innocent from
conviction. • • • "
**As harbingers of the trend, Justice Schaefer cites Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963);
and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
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There is, indeed, a clearly discernable movement toward
increased discovery in criminal cases.*

But discovery will remain

largely a "one way street" so long as the accused may invoke the
privilege.
Nor would mutual discovery procedures, familiar in civil
cases,

be

entirely appropriate in criminal cases.

The real need is

for discovery or interrogation before a judicial officer, where the
suspect's rights can be safeguarded but where the goal would be
ascertainment of the facts - as known both to the prosecution
and the defense - at an early stage in the proceedings.

The magistrate,

before whom the suspect would be brought promptly, would advise of
the right to remain silent.

But the suspect should also "be advised

that if he is subsequently charged, his failure to answer will be
disclosed at his trial."

This would be the only sanction.*1t

Justice Schaefer recognizes, of course, that judicially supervised interrogation would be impossible under prevailing Court
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment.

The seriousness and difficulty

of amending the Bill of Rights is self-evident; yet, it is probable
that most lawyers, and other citizens as well, will agree that "the
time has come for intensive public consideration" of a solution of
the interrogation dilemma.

*See Report, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 138, 139 (1967).
**Interestingly, Justice Schaefer's proposal has precendent . under the
early common law in England, accused felons were examined by
magistrates and their answers were introduced in evidence at trial.
See 8 Wigmore, Evidence 286 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Morgan, supra,
at 18. The English practice was followed in the American colonies.
Morgan, supra, at 18-19.
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This forthright call for consideration of a constitutional

amendment, by one of Justice Schaefer's stature, judicial experience
and dedication to justice, deserves the most thoughtful response.*

*See Report, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, Additional Views of Seven Members,
303-308 (1967), endorsing in substance Justice Schaefer's proposal.

